There is no other kind of trading in India but the insider variety,” remarked a former president of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in 1992, whereas Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), viewed it as one with no place in any law-abiding economy. Between these ends of the spectrum lies the debate on insider trading. Although India was not late in recognizing the detrimental impact of insider trading on the rights of shareholders, corporate governance and financial markets, the legal regime, including the enforcement mechanism relating to its prevention, remains in a nascent stage. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Prohibition of Insider Trading Regulations, 2015 (PIT Regulations) prohibit insider trading while in possession of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) subject to certain exceptions. Rule four of the PIT Regulations contains provisions apropos trading when in possession of UPSI. Trades carried out by a person who has UPSI would be presumed to have been motivated by the knowledge and awareness of such information and they shall be held guilty of insider trading. Simply put, any abuse of position or power by insiders for personal benefits, monetary or otherwise, is a fraud committed on public shareholders, who expect unbiased management of the company’s operations in their interest. The 2020 amendments to the PIT Regulations aim at bolstering the level of compliance and mitigating the defects plaguing them. Prior to the amendment, there was considerable confusion with respect to the handling of UPSI by intermediaries. Notwithstanding the FAQs released by the SEBI to address the same, specific details regarding the maintenance of the digital database by such entities continued to remain shrouded in uncertainty. Further, the list of transactions under Schedule B of the Regulations, exempting them from trading window restrictions, was not amenable to additions. This prohibited reasonable expansion of the same to include transactions of a like nature. Lastly, there was also the issue of lack of adherence to the code of conduct under the PIT Regulations.
Recent amendments to insider trading: Through a previous amendment that came into effect on April 1, 2019, the SEBI had mandated every listed entity, intermediary and fiduciary to maintain a structured digital database, which would have the name and PAN details of a person with whom the UPSI was shared. This was done to ensure that there was a trail of information whenever the SEBI needed to investigate the sharing of UPSI. Now, through an amendment in July, the SEBI has mandated that the nature of the UPSI and the details of the person sharing it must also be recorded in the database. Moreover, maintaining such a database has to be done internally and cannot be outsourced. The database should store data for the previous eight years at any given time.
The second most notable amendment is that the trading window restrictions would no more apply to “offer for sale” (OFS) and “Rights Entitlement” (RE). Schedule B of the PIT Regulations mandates that there should be a closure of the trading window for designated people and their relatives as it can be reasonably expected that they possess UPSI. However, through another notification in July, the SEBI allowed the selling of promoters’ holding by way of OFS and exercising RE during the period of closure of the trading window.
The SEBI also specified that listed entities, intermediaries and fiduciaries are now mandated to promptly and voluntarily report any Code of Conduct violation under the PIT Regulations in the prescribed format to the bourses and any amount recovered from the defaulter shall be deposited in the Investor Protection and Education Fund.
Analysis and impact: The primary benefit of the amendment that mandated a structured digital database is reduced information asymmetry while the SEBI investigates matters of insider trading. In cases relating to it, distinguishing the insider who conveyed the UPSI, in any case, turns out to be progressively significant for narrowing down expected guilty parties and to follow the data trail. This was one of the pertinent issues in the ongoing “WhatsApp spill” case wherein after extensive investigations, the SEBI had punished certain people for spilling data identified to be price-sensitive. However, since WhatsApp messages are typically ensured through end-to-end encryption, the SEBI could not efficiently recognize the entities involved in the trade, thus setting an alarmingly low standard of proof in such cases. It is hoped that the new, organized and structured digital database may help and forestall such cases. The second amendment that cuts a special exception to the trading window is in the light of the ongoing endeavors by the SEBI to facilitate easy routes of raising capital. This is much needed and will give more chances to listed entities to raise fast capital. Lastly, the mandatory announcing of infringement of the code of conduct would make a more strong system of compliance.
Regulatory solutions: With each of these amendments, while the SEBI has chalked out additional responsibilities for intermediaries and fiduciaries, as well as streamlined its regulatory powers with bourses, the overall impact on the market hygiene remains to be seen. While there seem to be concerned regarding the degree and extent of control that may be exercised by stock exchanges over unlisted entities, the same will depend on the successful implementation of the PIT Amendment and issuance of further clarifications and circulars by SEBI.
The requirement of maintaining an enhanced digital database is in line with the SEBI’s probe and surveillance procedure. However, it may lead to particular operational challenges and issues for the listed firm, intermediary or fiduciary, because in addition to maintaining more data for a more extended period, the entity is no longer permitted to outsource the task of keeping the database.
Market conduct regulation is poised at a critical threshold in India, where a combination of nuanced laws and efficient enforcement can indeed be transformative. When understood in their true spirit, these amendments are capable of engendering a behavioral shift across corporates, their Board and other key stakeholders, in terms of how we balance commercial interests with accountability for information access. As the market practice evolves on this, one can only hope that we can achieve that fine yet firm balance, amply aided by even-handed regulatory practices and judicial momentum.